Changelog#

All notable changes to Pipelock will be documented in this file.

The format is based on Keep a Changelog,
and this project adheres to Semantic Versioning.

[2.1.2] - 2026-04-06#

Highlights#

Every proxy decision now produces a cryptographically signed action receipt: verdict, policy hash, transport, and target recorded as a hash-chained evidence trail. New onboarding tools (pipelock init, Helm chart, false positive tuning guide) cut first-run setup to minutes. Runtime hardening adds connection-level admission control, browser-aware response scanning, and environment classification. An immutable core scanner layer runs before all configurable patterns and cannot be disabled.

New Features#

• Action receipts: every proxy decision produces an Ed25519-signed receipt recording the action type, verdict, policy hash, transport, method, and target. New internal/receipt/ package. pipelock verify-receipt CLI command validates receipt signatures. Receipts are written to the flight recorder. (#351)
• Hash-chained receipts and transcript roots: receipts link to their predecessor via chain_prev_hash and chain_seq, forming a tamper-evident chain. EmitTranscriptRoot() seals the chain with a transcript root entry. pipelock verify-receipt validates individual receipts and chain integrity. (#354)
• Onboarding stack: pipelock init discovers IDE configs, generates a starter YAML config, and runs canary verification against the running proxy. Helm chart at charts/pipelock/ for Kubernetes deployments. False positive tuning guide for common scanner adjustments. README restructured around getting-started flow. (#355)
• Airlock admission control: connection-level admission with a drain tier for graceful shutdown. New connections are rejected when the proxy enters drain state, while in-flight requests complete. (#356)
• Browser Shield: domain-aware response scanning exemptions for browser traffic. Domains serving rendered HTML (dashboards, documentation sites) skip injection scanning to avoid false positives on legitimate page content. (#356)
• Posture Capsule: runtime environment classification detects whether pipelock runs in a container, on bare metal, or in a cloud instance. Classification is exposed via metrics and audit logs. (#356)
• Immutable core scanner: built-in DLP and response injection patterns run before all configurable scanners and cannot be disabled or overridden by config. New core_dlp and core_response scanner labels. Bundle metadata v2 adds freshness checks, deprecation notices, and build-time pinning for pattern bundles. (#359)

Security Hardening#

• TLS interception receipts: TLS-intercepted traffic now produces action receipts across 19 emission points in the intercept pipeline. Previously, intercepted requests were scanned but not recorded in the receipt chain. (#362)
• Flight recorder DLP redaction: receipt fields containing target URLs and matched patterns are scrubbed by the DLP pipeline before writing to the flight recorder. Receipt structure fields (signature, signer_key, chain hashes) are preserved. Summary field no longer includes raw matched content. (#362)
• Receipt emitter hot reload: signing key can be added, removed, or rotated via SIGHUP without restarting the proxy. Receipt emission state survives config reloads. (#362)
• A2A SSE streaming receipts: Server-Sent Event streams in the A2A protocol path now produce per-event receipts. (#362)
• Multipart body scanning: all multipart part bodies are now scanned regardless of declared Content-Type. Parts declaring image/png or other binary types with text content are no longer skipped. Custom multipart part headers are scanned for DLP patterns. Content-Transfer-Encoding (base64, quoted-printable) is decoded before scanning. Structural header parameters (Content-Disposition, Content-Type values) are parsed and scanned. (#370)

Fixed#

• Inline suppression in scan-diff: pipelock:ignore inline comments are now respected in GitHub Action scan-diff mode. Previously, suppression comments were only processed in full-scan mode. (#365)
• Airlock drain timeout: drain timeout now reads from config instead of using a hardcoded default. (#371)
• Browser Shield redirect hostname: post-redirect hostname is used for domain matching instead of the original request hostname. (#371)
• Session manager lock TOCTOU: time-of-check-to-time-of-use race in the session manager lock acquisition path is closed. (#371)
• Quarantined session eviction: quarantined sessions are protected from LRU eviction. (#371)

Other#

• Documentation cross-references: README restored with full feature content, security matrix, and pipelab.org cross-references. OWASP coverage table added. (#363)
• CI dependency updates: GitHub Actions bumped across CI workflows. (#358)
• Go dependency updates: modernc.org/sqlite bumped from 1.48.0 to 1.48.1. (#357)

[2.1.1] - 2026-04-03#

Highlights#

Scanner hardening and internal quality release. Nine security fixes close gaps found during Gauntlet benchmark development. Recursive response decoding catches multi-layer encoding evasion. Continuous fuzzing via ClusterFuzzLite. Major refactors reduce parameter sprawl across the proxy and MCP packages. New Codex integration guide.

Security Hardening#

• SSRF trust gap closed: allowlisted domains resolving to internal IPs now correctly bypass SSRF checks only for DNS results, not for encoded IP literals in the URL. Prevents trust domain bypass via hex/octal IP encoding. (#334)
• MCP batch request rejection: JSON-RPC batch requests (JSON arrays) rejected at ingress. Batch requests could bypass per-request scanning by bundling multiple operations. (#335)
• SSRF hex/octal IP decoding: SSRF scanner decodes hex (0x7f000001), octal (0177.0.0.1), and decimal (2130706433) IP representations before private-range checks. Separate subdomain entropy threshold prevents false positives on short hostnames. (#336)
• MCP input DLP hardening: new DLP patterns for MCP tool arguments including path-based exfiltration and additional coverage for encoded payloads. (#337)
• Chain detection and shell obfuscation: expanded chain pattern matching and shell obfuscation normalization for additional evasion techniques. (#338)
• Hangul Filler normalization: Unicode codepoints U+115F, U+1160, U+3164 (Hangul Fillers) added to invisible character stripping. Prevents pattern matching evasion via these characters. (#339)
• Recursive response decoding: senary scanner pass now decodes up to 5 layers of nested base64/hex encoding. Previously a single layer was decoded, allowing multi-layer chains (base64→hex→URL) to evade detection. (#344)
• DLP and tool scanner pattern widening: broader DLP patterns and tool poisoning detection for improved Gauntlet benchmark coverage. (#348)
• Injection pattern hardening: Tool Invocation pattern widened to match varied phrasing ("urgently call a hidden function"). Instruction Boundary pattern now detects Llama 2 <<SYS>> closing tag. (#350)

New Features#

• ClusterFuzzLite integration: continuous fuzzing on every PR with 9 fuzz targets covering URL scanning, DLP, response scanning, normalization, tool extraction, chain classification, and config parsing. (#339)
• Codex integration guide: docs/guides/codex.md covers securing OpenAI Codex with pipelock's MCP proxy, forward proxy, and recommended config.
• Stats drift guard: make stats target and TestCanonicalStats verify pattern counts, dependency counts, and preset counts on every PR. (#342)

Refactored#

• LogContext struct: replaces 8+ repeated audit log parameters across all proxy and MCP packages with a single struct. Reduces parameter passing noise and makes future field additions non-breaking. (#340)
• InterceptContext struct: replaces repeated TLS intercept pipeline parameters with a structured context. (#340)
• BodyScanRequest struct: consolidates body scanning parameters, server timeout constants extracted, OnClose utility added. (#345)
• Signal recording consolidation: shared signal recording logic extracted, mcp/input.go split for maintainability. (#346)
• Relay extraction: tunnel relay and hop-by-hop header helpers extracted into relay.go. (#347)

Other#

• PR review commands: /review tests, /review docs, /review stats trigger focused review passes via GitHub Actions. (#339)
• Numbered comment lists removed: prevents cascading diff noise when inserting items. (#344)

[2.1.0] - 2026-03-30#

Added#

• Sandbox --best-effort flag: gracefully degrades when user namespace creation is blocked (e.g. k8s containers with default seccomp). Landlock and seccomp containment layers still apply. Network scanning uses proxy-based routing instead of kernel-enforced namespace isolation. (#289)
• Sandbox --env flag: pass environment variables to sandboxed processes (KEY or KEY=VALUE, repeatable). Validates against dangerous keys (LD_PRELOAD, NODE_OPTIONS, etc.) that could subvert containment. (#289)
• MCP proxy --sandbox-best-effort flag: parity with pipelock sandbox --best-effort for MCP stdio wrapping mode. (#292)
• Pure Go netlink loopback: sandbox uses raw netlink syscalls to bring up loopback inside network namespaces. No ip binary required. Works in minimal container images without iproute2. (#289)
• pipelock assess command: signed security assessments with evidence capture, secret redaction, and HTML report. assess init starts a session, assess run executes attack simulations and captures evidence, assess finalize produces a PDF-ready HTML report with visual hierarchy, remediation guidance, and an optional signed attestation bundle. Secrets and server names are redacted from evidence before output. (#296, #301, #306)
• pipelock assess finalize --attestation: produces attestation.json and a detached Ed25519 signature for the finalized report. --badge derives an SVG badge from the attestation. (#314)
• Compliance evidence mappings: internal/report/compliance maps pipelock controls against OWASP MCP Top 10, OWASP Agentic Top 15, NIST 800-53, EU AI Act, and SOC 2. Compliance atlas threads through assess finalize output. (#314)
• trusted_domains for forward proxy: allowlist domains whose DNS resolves to private IPs without disabling SSRF protection globally. Useful for local inference endpoints and internal services. Community contribution. (#297)
• exempt_domains for response scanning: per-domain opt-out from injection scanning with DLP still applied. Prevents false positives from high-volume API response traffic. (#305)
• MCP redirect handlers (built-in): two built-in redirect profiles — fetch-proxy routes matched tool calls through pipelock's fetch proxy with full injection scanning, quarantine-write captures file write arguments to a quarantine path for review. Handler output is scanned for injection before returning to the agent. (#307)
• Session admin API: GET /api/v1/sessions lists adaptive enforcement sessions; POST /api/v1/sessions/{key}/reset clears escalation state and allows autonomous block_all recovery after clean traffic. Operations are audit-logged. (#308)
• Flight recorder: hash-chained JSONL evidence log with configurable retention, signed checkpoints, DLP redaction, and optional X25519 key escrow for encrypted raw capture. New flight_recorder config section. (#309)
• Agent Bill of Materials (aBOM): CycloneDX 1.6 BOM generation with declared-vs-observed tool inventory, confidence scoring, and dormant/unexpected tool classification. New internal/abom package. (#309)
• MCP binary integrity: internal/integrity package generates and verifies file manifests (SHA-256, permissions) for MCP server directories. Detects modified, added, removed, and permission-changed files. (#310)
• Denial-of-wallet detection: internal/proxy/dow.go tracks tool call budgets per session — loop detection, runaway expansion, retry storms, fan-out limits, concurrent call limits, and wall-clock caps. New denial_of_wallet config section. (#310)
• Session manifest and signed decision records: internal/manifest captures versioned session snapshots (policy hash, tool inventory, verdict summary, behavioral fingerprint). internal/recorder writes signed decision records per enforcement event. (#312)
• Canary token detection: canary_tokens config section defines synthetic secrets injected via env vars. Detections trigger a block and audit event. pipelock canary CLI helper prints config snippets. (#313)
• pipelock simulate expansion: simulate command extended with new attack scenarios. Covers DLP exfiltration, prompt injection, tool poisoning, SSRF, and URL evasion. Known-limitation tagging distinguishes scanner gaps from failures. (#313)
• A2A protocol scanning foundation: a2a_scanning config section enables scanning of Google A2A (Agent-to-Agent) protocol traffic in forward proxy and MCP HTTP proxy paths. Field-aware scanning with agent card poisoning detection, card drift (rug-pull) detection, session smuggling detection, and configurable context caps. (#316)
• SecureIQLab Docker Compose test harness: test/secureiqlab/ provides a ready-to-run environment for validating pipelock against adversarial AI agent attack scenarios. Includes mock LLM, mock MCP server, log collector, and pre-baked pipelock configs. (#318)

Fixed#

• Sandbox best-effort seccomp: io_uring handling changed from KILL_PROCESS to EPERM so runtimes like Node.js 22 that probe io_uring at startup can gracefully fall back to epoll instead of crashing. (#289)
• Sandbox seccomp readlink syscall: added SYS_READLINK (nr 89) to the allowlist. Node.js/libuv uses the legacy readlink syscall directly, not readlinkat. (#289)
• Sandbox secret dir validation: secretDirs() now only protects directories that actually exist. Prevents false validation errors in containers. (#289)
• Sandbox bridge proxy dynamic port: in best-effort mode, uses a dynamically allocated port instead of the hardcoded 8888. (#289)
• Config reload — sandbox best-effort: sandbox.best_effort changes are detected during hot reload. Per-agent best_effort propagated through enterprise merge. Config validation enforces mutual exclusivity of sandbox.best_effort and sandbox.strict. (#289)
• File sentry best-effort mode: file sentry in MCP proxy mode now respects best_effort flag and degrades gracefully when filesystem watching is unavailable rather than failing hard. (#292)
• Scanner result classification: scanner results carry a structured classification (category, transport, layer) that drives adaptive enforcement signal recording. Prevents the death spiral where every enforcement event generates a new escalation signal. (#295)
• Autonomous block_all recovery: adaptive enforcement sessions at block_all level now auto-deescalate after a configurable window of clean traffic. Previously, sessions could be permanently locked out with no recovery path outside of a config reload. (#304)
• Suppress glob port matching: strip standard ports (:443, :80) and cross-slash glob for URL patterns. Fixes suppress rules silently failing on TLS-intercepted URLs. (#328)
• Config defaults via Load(): applySecurityDefaults for 8 security-critical booleans and ApplyDefaults for all v2.1.0 config structs. Prevents unsafe Go zero values when users partially configure new features. (#328)
• Adaptive enforcement exempt domains: exempt domains are now scanned for visibility (findings logged as warn) but adaptive scoring is skipped and actions are not upgraded. Prevents death spiral from LLM response false positives. All 5 transports. (#328)
• DoW tracker wiring: denial-of-wallet tracking wired into MCP stdio, HTTP, and WS proxy paths. dow_action: warn mode supported. Falls back to _default agent profile for free tier. (#328)
• Behavioral baseline directory auto-creation in NewManager. (#328)
• License gate preserves _default profile when rejecting unlicensed named agents. (#328)
• Feature wiring: FlightRecorder, BehavioralBaseline, MCPToolProvenance, and MCPBinaryIntegrity connected to proxy runtime. Previously config-only stubs. (#328)
• Provenance audit logging for block and warn-mode unsigned tools. (#328)
• DoW metadata backfill for scan-disabled configurations. (#328)

Refactored#

• Shared escalation recording helper: decide.RecordEscalation extracted as a shared helper used by all proxy and MCP enforcement paths. Eliminates duplicated escalation logic across fetch, forward, WebSocket, and MCP transports. (#290)
• MCPProxyOpts struct: long MCP proxy parameter lists replaced with a single MCPProxyOpts options struct. Reduces argument count from 13+ parameters to a single struct, making future additions non-breaking. (#294)
• RunHTTPListenerProxy refactored from 20-parameter function to MCPProxyOpts struct. (#328)
• CLI god package split: 91-file, 10,000+ line CLI package split into 10 focused subpackages: assess, audit, canary, diag, generate, git, rules, runtime, setup, signing. Each subpackage is independently testable. (#303)
• atomicfile shared package: internal/atomicfile extracted as a shared atomic write primitive used by signing, integrity, and recorder packages. Eliminates duplicate implementations. (#302)

Testing & CI#

• Coverage boost — atomicfile package: internal/atomicfile covered by dedicated tests including OS-level write error injection via a WriteFile dependency injection interface. (#302)
• Scanner coverage — encoded payloads and cross-transport DLP: new tests covering base64/hex-encoded payload detection, segment-level decode paths, and DLP scanning across fetch, forward proxy, and MCP stdio transports. (#315)
• Comprehensive coverage boost: (#317, #328)
• GitHub Action references migrated from v1 to v2: all actions/checkout, actions/setup-go, actions/upload-artifact, and third-party action refs updated to v2+ across CI workflows. (#291)
• pip deps pinned with hashes: Python test dependencies pinned with --require-hashes in requirements files. Makefile fmt and lint targets fixed. (#298)
• requests dependency bumped. (#300)
• MCP tool provenance and profile-then-lock baseline: (#311)
• Policy capture and replay engine: (#319)
• Structured exit codes and subprocess error handling: (#320)
• v2.1.0 polish fixes: (#321)
• Config.Validate split, DRY audit logger, coverage boost: (#322)
• Scan redirect handler output through DLP pipeline: (#323)
• Grafana dashboard expanded to 45 metrics across 14 rows with panels for cross-request detection, adaptive enforcement, scan API, TLS interception, address protection, file sentry, reverse proxy, and capture system.
• Prometheus alert rules expanded to 28 covering all actionable metrics including DLP, TLS, cross-request, adaptive enforcement, address poisoning, file sentry, and kill switch state.
• Unversioned release archives for stable /releases/latest/download/ curl installs. (#324)

[2.0.0] - 2026-03-22#

Added#

• Process sandbox (Linux): Landlock filesystem restriction, seccomp syscall filtering, and network namespace isolation for any agent process. Two modes: pipelock mcp proxy --sandbox for MCP servers, pipelock sandbox -- COMMAND for standalone agents. Agents run in a sandboxed child process with restricted filesystem visibility and no direct network access — HTTP traffic routes through pipelock's scanner pipeline via a bridge proxy. Requires kernel 5.13+ with Landlock and user namespace support. (#267)

• Process sandbox (macOS): sandbox-exec with dynamically generated SBPL profiles. Deny-all baseline with explicit allows. Same approach as Anthropic srt, Cursor, and OpenAI Codex. pipelock sandbox diagnose reports platform capabilities. (#275)

• Per-agent sandbox profiles: Named sandbox configurations with per-profile filesystem grants, network policy, and syscall allowlists. --sandbox-strict flag denies all filesystem access outside an explicit allowlist. Subreaper for descendant cleanup. Sandbox preflight and diagnostics. (#272)

• Redirect policy action: First-class redirect action for MCP tool policy that routes matched tool calls to audited handler programs instead of blocking. Redirect profiles define the handler executable, reason, and argument passing. Synthetic JSON-RPC success responses returned to the agent. Response scanning on handler output prevents injection. Fail-closed on handler failure or timeout. Action precedence: block > redirect > ask > warn. (#271)

• Full-schema tool poisoning detection: collectAllSchemaText recursively extracts text from nested inputSchema objects (properties, descriptions, enums, defaults, examples) for injection scanning. Previously only top-level tool description was scanned. (#270)

• State and control response patterns: 6 new injection detection patterns targeting state manipulation, control flow hijacking, and authority assertion with DOTALL matching for multiline payloads. Response pattern count 13 to 19. (#270)

• Config security scoring: pipelock audit score analyzes configuration for security posture with 12 category checks, 0-100 scoring, letter grades (A-F), and tool policy overpermission audit. JSON output for CI integration. (#273)

• JetBrains/Junie MCP proxy integration: pipelock jetbrains install wraps JetBrains IDE MCP server configs through pipelock's MCP proxy. Supports --sandbox and --workspace flags for sandboxed operation. (#260, #269)

• Adaptive enforcement exempt_domains: Per-domain exemption from cross-request entropy budget with wildcard matching. Prevents false entropy accumulation from repeated API calls to LLM providers. (#268)

• OWASP MCP Top 10 coverage mapping: Comprehensive mapping of pipelock's controls against the OWASP MCP Security Top 10 taxonomy. (#274)

• NIST 800-53 control mapping: 7 control families (AC, AU, CA, CM, IR, SC, SI) mapped with per-control coverage assessment. (#274)

• Attack simulation: pipelock simulate runs 24 synthetic attack scenarios against a config and reports a security scorecard. 5 categories: DLP exfiltration, prompt injection, tool poisoning, SSRF, URL evasion. Scanner attribution verifies the correct layer detected each attack. --json output for CI, exit code 1 on misses. (#277)

• HTTP reverse proxy: Generic reverse proxy mode for any HTTP service with bidirectional body scanning. Request bodies scanned for DLP (secret exfiltration), response bodies scanned for prompt injection. Fail-closed on compressed bodies, read errors, and ask mode. pipelock run --reverse-proxy --reverse-upstream URL. New reverse_proxy config section. (#278)

• SSRF trusted domains: trusted_domains config option allows internal services with public DNS records that resolve to private IPs. Agents connecting to localhost dev servers, local inference endpoints, or internal services with RFC1918 addresses can be explicitly allowed without disabling SSRF protection globally. (#281, closes #276, #279)

Fixed#

• Reverse proxy fail-closed on oversized responses: Responses exceeding max_response_bytes are now blocked instead of passing through unscanned. (#281)
• Reverse proxy URL DLP scanning: Request URL path and query string are now scanned for DLP patterns on the reverse proxy, matching forward proxy behavior. (#281)
• Kill switch preemption on long-lived transports: Kill switch state is checked per-read/frame/message on CONNECT tunnels, WebSocket, and MCP stdio/HTTP/WS transports. Previously only checked at connection setup. (#281)
• SSE reconnect loop kill switch: GET-mode SSE stream reconnect loop now exits when kill switch is active instead of retrying indefinitely. (#281)
• Memory persistence pattern expansion: Additional terminal phrases added to the memory persistence directive injection pattern for broader coverage. (#281)

Changed#

• Action precedence updated: block(4) > redirect(3) > ask(2) > warn(1). Unknown actions still fail closed to block.
• Direct dependencies increased from 15 to 17 (added go-landlock for sandbox, updated protobuf).
• Binary size increased from ~17MB to ~18MB (sandbox + SQLite runtime). Dev builds are ~24MB due to debug symbols.

Deployment Notes#

• Linux sandbox requires kernel 5.13+ with Landlock and user namespace support. Run pipelock sandbox diagnose to check prerequisites.
• macOS sandbox uses sandbox-exec (seatbelt profiles). Beta — CI-tested on GitHub Actions macOS runners.
• Redirect profiles reference handler executables that must exist on the host. Validate with pipelock audit score.
• New config sections: sandbox (profiles, strict mode), redirect_profiles (on mcp_tool_policy).

[1.5.0] - 2026-03-20#

Added#

• Adaptive enforcement v2: sessions that accumulate threat signals now escalate through three levels (elevated, high, critical), upgrading actions at every enforcement point across all proxy and MCP transports. Live escalation queries tighten enforcement mid-connection. New internal/session/ package, UpgradeAction() in internal/decide/, configurable per-level behavior via adaptive_enforcement.levels. Prometheus metrics pipelock_adaptive_upgrades_total and pipelock_adaptive_sessions_current. 181 new tests. (#256)
• Financial DLP with checksum validation: credit card (Luhn) and IBAN (mod-97) detection with post-match checksum validation that eliminates 90-99% of false positives. New Validator field on DLPPattern for extensible validated patterns. Covers Visa, Mastercard (including 2221-2720), Amex, Discover, JCB, and 80+ IBAN countries. ABA routing number validator available as opt-in. DLP count 44 to 46. 70 new tests. (#258)
• Key-scoped tool policy matching: arg_key field scopes arg_pattern to specific top-level argument keys. Block read_file when file_path contains /etc/shadow without false positives on other arguments. Raw argument JSON threaded through all enforcement paths. (#257)
• Community rules rollout: rules.KeyringHex wired into build ldflags (Makefile, GoReleaser, Dockerfile) so release binaries verify official bundle signatures. Official registry URL set to pipelab.org/rules/. docs/rules.md user guide. Community Rules section in README. Commented rules: section in all 7 presets. (#255)
• Filesystem sentinel for subprocess MCP mode: real-time filesystem monitoring detects secrets written to disk by agent subprocesses that bypass the MCP pipe. Recursive directory watching with 50ms write debounce, DLP content scanning, process lineage attribution (Linux), and rename-into-place bypass prevention. Watches arm synchronously before child launch (no startup race). Fail-closed when enabled. (#261)
• OTLP log export sink: OpenTelemetry log export as a third emit sink alongside webhook and syslog. Events sent as OTLP LogRecords over HTTP/protobuf to a collector endpoint. No gRPC dependency (uses protowire). Async buffered queue with bounded retry on 429/5xx per OTLP spec. 15 new tests. (#262)

Fixed#

• Transport parity: WebSocket header DLP now scans all 7 forwarded headers (was 4 auth-only). Forward HTTP proxy now scans responses for prompt injection when response_scanning is enabled. Fail-closed on compressed responses that cannot be scanned. Closes the last transport parity gap. (#254)
• Shell normalization hardened against 3 evasion techniques: $@/$* positional parameter insertion, ${HOME:0:1} path construction, and backtick command substitution now resolve before policy matching. Pipeline ordering fixed so indirect expansion resolves before slash replacement. (#259)
• Windows release builds: pipelock rules now uses an OS-specific lock implementation so the CLI cross-compiles cleanly for Windows targets. (#252)
• DLP action validation: dlp.action and per-pattern action fields were silently dropped by YAML unmarshaling. Now rejected at startup with an error message pointing to the correct transport-level settings. (#264)
• Adaptive enforcement death spiral: CONNECT hostname no longer counted toward CEE entropy budget (the destination hostname is not exfiltration data). Time-based de-escalation added so sessions at block level can recover after clean traffic. Prevents permanent lockout from repeated polling to the same host. (#266)

Deployment Notes#

• TLS interception with cross_request_detection enabled: set bits_per_window to 500,000+ and configure exempt_domains for LLM providers to avoid false entropy accumulation from repeated API calls.

Tests#

• WebSocket and TLS interception transport wiring: integration tests for address poisoning detection, cross-request exfiltration entropy, response scanning strip action, full CONNECT-hijack-SNI-intercept-scan integration, and injection blocking. Coverage: clientToUpstream 61% to 88%, handleConnect TLS branch 0% to 86%. (#253)

[1.4.0] - 2026-03-17#

Added#

• Community rule bundles (infrastructure): signed YAML detection pattern bundles with Ed25519 keyring verification, pipelock rules install/update/list/verify/diff/remove CLI, CalVer versioning, lock file tracking, and bundle provenance threading through all scanner match types. New rules config section with trusted_keys and auto_update. Public rule bundle and hosting will follow in a point release. (#247)
• Crypto address poisoning detection: validates ETH, BTC, SOL, and BNB blockchain addresses against a user-supplied allowlist and flags lookalike addresses using prefix/suffix similarity scoring. New address_protection config section. internal/addressprotect/ package with chain-specific validators and Bech32/Base58/EIP-55 checksum support. (#233)
• Address similarity tracker: session-scoped fingerprinting with LRU eviction detects when multiple similar-looking addresses appear in the same session, a key indicator of address poisoning attacks. (#231)
• Response scanning pre-filter: keyword-gated regex skips expensive normalization and pattern matching when no injection keywords are present in the text. Cuts clean-text scan latency significantly. (#230)
• Response pre-filter extended to opt-space and vowel-fold passes: all three normalization passes now use keyword pre-filtering, not just the first pass. (#245)
• Delimiter-separated hex encoding detection: normalizeHex() strips 6 delimiter formats (:, -, , ,, \x prefix, 0x prefix) across all DLP paths, catching secrets encoded as colon-separated, space-separated, or C-style hex notation. (#243)
• DLP patterns for Groq, xAI, GitLab, New Relic, and Stripe webhooks: built-in pattern count expanded from 36 to 41. (#246)
• Crypto secret DLP detection: BIP-39 seed phrase detection via dedicated internal/seedprotect/ package with dictionary lookup, sliding window, and SHA-256 checksum validation. Three new regex patterns for Bitcoin WIF, extended private keys (xprv/yprv/zprv/tprv), and Ethereum private keys. DLP count now 44. New seed_phrase_detection config section. (#249)
• VS Code MCP proxy integration: pipelock vscode install wraps VS Code MCP server configs through pipelock's MCP proxy for bidirectional scanning. pipelock vscode remove cleanly unwraps. Supports project and global scope, dry-run preview, atomic writes with backup. (#248)
• Trial tier and one-time purchase support for license service: Polar webhook handler now processes trial and one-time purchase events alongside subscriptions. (#232)
• Scan API reference documentation (docs/scan-api.md): full API reference for the POST /api/v1/scan endpoint covering all four scan kinds, auth, rate limiting, error codes, and integration patterns.
• Address protection and scan API config reference sections added to docs/configuration.md.
• Hostile-model preset surfaced in README Security Matrix with feature callout.

Changed#

• Minimum Go version bumped from 1.24 to 1.25. CI matrix now tests Go 1.25 and 1.26. (#242)

Fixed#

• K8s Secret volume compatibility: license key and signing key file loading now follows symlinks (required for Kubernetes Secret volume mounts where files are symlinked through ..data/). (#229)
• MCP tools/list false positive on empty responses: skip general response scanning when tools/list returns an empty or all-unnamed tool array. Malformed tools values still fall through to injection scanning. (#250)
• Keystore symlink escape: generateAgent now validates path containment after symlink resolution, preventing private key writes to attacker-controlled locations outside the keystore boundary. Containment check covers both leaf symlinks and symlinked parent directories.

Docs#

• Adversarial testing methodology section added to security assurance docs. Benchmark data refreshed for Go 1.25. Scanner pipeline description updated from 9 to 11 layers. (#228)
• Security claims hedged and coverage disclaimers added across docs. (#234)
• Demo assets, fleet dashboard screenshot, and egress report updated. (#235)

CI#

• sigstore/cosign-installer bumped from 4.0.0 to 4.1.0. (#237)
• docker/login-action bumped from 3.7.0 to 4.0.0. (#241)

[1.3.0] - 2026-03-13#

Added#

• Scan API endpoint (POST /api/v1/scan): evaluate URLs, text, and MCP payloads against the scanner pipeline via HTTP. Returns structured findings with MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs, severity, and per-layer results. Configurable via scan_api config section. (#223)
• SARIF output for pipelock audit and pipelock git scan-diff: --format sarif produces SARIF v2.1.0 for GitHub Code Scanning integration. Findings appear as inline annotations on PR diffs via the upload-sarif action. (#217)
• CRLF injection detection: blocks %0d%0a, double-encoded %250d%250a, and raw CR/LF in URL scheme, authority, path, and query components. Fragments excluded (never reach upstream). (#224)
• Path traversal detection: blocks /../, encoded variants (%2e%2e/, ..%2f, ..%5c), partial encoding, double-encoded %252e%252e, and mixed-boundary patterns using segment-bounded matching to avoid false positives. (#224)
• CONNECT header DLP scanning: scans Proxy-Authorization and other headers on CONNECT handshake for leaked secrets before tunnel establishment. (#224)
• Subdomain entropy exclusions: subdomain_entropy_exclusions config field whitelists domains with legitimately high-entropy subdomains (e.g., RunPod GPU instances). Wildcard matching (*.runpod.net) covers all subdomain depths. (#222)
• License service scaffold: cluster-only webhook handler for Polar subscription events. Alpine-based Docker image, SQLite entitlement store, append-only audit ledger. ELv2 licensed. (#218)
• License service build artifacts: GoReleaser pipeline builds linux/amd64+arm64 Docker images for the license service with multi-arch manifests and build provenance attestation. (#226)
• pipelock license install command: accepts a license token and writes it to the local license file for pipelock to read at startup. (#216)
• Runtime license loading: load license from PIPELOCK_LICENSE_KEY env var or license_file config path. (#213)
• License tier and subscription fields: tier and subscription_id in license tokens for entitlement gating. (#215)
• Sentry error tracking: opt-in Sentry integration for crash reporting in production deployments. (#211)
• OWASP LLM Top 10 mapping document: article-by-article coverage analysis against OWASP LLM Top 10 2025. (#220)

Changed#

• Scanner context threading: Scanner.Scan now accepts context.Context for DNS cancellation propagation. All proxy paths pass request context through. (#221)
• Metrics refactored: structured initialization, per-transport counters, scan API metrics. (#223)
• License token enrichment: tier and subscription_id fields are now populated during license service minting. (#226)

Fixed#

• Config fail-open on omitted security booleans: response_scanning.enabled, mcp_input_scanning.enabled, and mcp_tool_scanning.enabled now default to true when omitted from YAML (previously defaulted to Go zero value false). (#219)
• WebSocket header DLP bypass: headers on WebSocket upgrade requests are now scanned for DLP patterns. (#219)
• secrets_file permission gap: file permission check now enforces 0o600 on secrets files. (#219)
• Capability separation language in docs: corrected claims about enforcement vs. deployment guidance. (#220)
• Adaptive enforcement accuracy in docs: clarified that v1 is scoring-only, not enforcement-aware. (#220)
• MCP tools/list false positive: instruction-like tool descriptions no longer trigger injection detection. (#224)
• URL fragment DLP coverage: URL fragments containing credential-like parameters are now detected by DLP scanning. (#224)
• Webhook idempotency: concurrent Polar webhook deliveries no longer double-mint licenses. (#226)
• Founding cap honor: paid founding checkouts are honored when cap is reached instead of silently downgrading to regular Pro. (#226)
• CLI license ledger: pipelock license issue no longer stores raw signed tokens in the ledger file (stores truncated SHA-256 hash for correlation). (#226)
• License service email and config defaults: corrected domain references from stale addresses to current domains. (#226)

[1.2.0] - 2026-03-11#

Added#

• Cross-request exfiltration detection (CEE): per-session entropy budget tracking and fragment reassembly with DLP re-scan catch secrets split across multiple requests. Integrated across all proxy paths (fetch, forward, TLS intercept, WebSocket, MCP). Strict and hostile-model presets enable CEE by default. (#206)
• DLP pattern expansion from 22 to 36 built-in patterns: AI/ML provider keys (Hugging Face, Databricks, Replicate, Together AI, Pinecone), infrastructure tokens (DigitalOcean, HashiCorp Vault, Vercel, Supabase), package registry tokens (npm, PyPI), and developer platform keys (Linear, Notion, Sentry) (#208)
• DLP prefix pre-filter: fast literal-prefix screening skips regex evaluation on URLs that contain no credential-like substrings, reducing DLP overhead on clean traffic (#209)

Changed#

• Release artifacts (Homebrew, GitHub releases, Docker images) now include paid-tier features that activate with a valid license key. Building from source without the enterprise tag produces a Community-only binary. (#212)

Fixed#

• Agent listeners now shut down on config reload when the license is revoked, preventing policy-free traffic after license expiry (#205)
• License headers normalized across all source files; documentation updated for dual-license clarity (#204)

[1.1.0] - 2026-03-09#

Added#

• pipelock discover command: scans MCP server configs (Claude Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VS Code) and shows which servers lack pipelock wrapping (#194)
• Parallel scanner benchmarks and concurrent scaling tests with performance documentation (#201)
• Security, Pipelock Scan, and CodeRabbit badges to README (#193)

Fixed#

• IPv6 listener collision detection: [::]:8888, 0.0.0.0:8888, and :8888 now correctly collide in agent listener validation (dual-stack systems bind all three to the same port)
• Non-canonical IPv6 addresses (e.g. [0000::1]) normalized via net.ParseIP for consistent collision detection
• Config hot-reload preserves agent listener state across reloads: removing a listener-bearing agent re-adds its full profile (prevents policy downgrade on bound ports), and new agent listeners are stripped (can't bind without restart). License expiry timestamps also preserved (watchdog timer set at startup only).

Changed#

• Enterprise module split: multi-agent features (per-agent identity, budgets, config isolation) moved to enterprise/ directory under Elastic License 2.0 (ELv2). Core remains Apache 2.0. (#202)
• Enterprise features require //go:build enterprise tag at compile time and a valid license key at runtime
• OSS builds silently ignore agents config section (no error, agents just don't activate)
• CI tests both OSS and enterprise build modes
• CI dependency updates: actions/checkout v6, docker/setup-buildx-action v4, docker/setup-qemu-action v4, actions/dependency-review-action v4.9, github/codeql-action v4.32.6

[1.0.0] - 2026-03-07#

Pipelock 1.0.0 is the production-ready release. All scanning layers, proxy modes, and MCP security features are stable and commercially supported.

Added#

• Per-agent identity profiles: named agent configurations with independent mode, enforce flag, API allowlist, DLP patterns, rate limits, and session profiling overrides
• Agent identity resolution chain: context override > X-Pipelock-Agent header > ?agent= query param > _default fallback
• Per-agent request budgets: configurable request count, byte transfer, and unique domain limits with rolling window enforcement
• Dedicated listener ports per agent for spoof-proof identity without relying on headers
• Source CIDR matching for agent identity
• --agent flag for MCP proxy: select agent profile for MCP proxy sessions
• Agent identity threaded through audit logs, Prometheus metrics, and JSON /stats breakdown
• X-Pipelock-Agent header stripped before forwarding to upstream (prevents agent impersonation)
• Ed25519 license key system: pipelock license keygen, pipelock license issue, and pipelock license inspect CLI commands with build-time public key embedding
• MCP tool policy: audit log tamper protection (blocks rm/truncate/shred on log files, history clearing)
• MCP tool policy: persistence detection for cron, systemd, init.d, launchd, and shell profile write paths with destination-aware matching
• Chain detection: write-persist and persist-callback patterns with argument-aware exec-to-persist reclassification
• Read-indicator downgrade: introspection tools no longer trigger false-positive persistence alerts
• request_body_scanning defaults in programmatic config (previously only available via preset files)
• IPv4/IPv6 multicast ranges added to default SSRF protection
• Social Security Number DLP pattern added to all config presets
• tool_chain_detection section added to all config presets
• --home flag for signing/keygen/verify/TLS CLI commands (container and rootless environment support)
• Config-relative CA path resolution for TLS interception (paths resolve relative to config file, not CWD)

Fixed#

• TLS interception shared transport: single http.Transport with connection pooling across intercepted CONNECT tunnels
• TLS passthrough domain reload warnings: set-diff detection catches same-size domain list replacements during config hot-reload
• TLS InstallCA refactored for testable OS-specific branches (certgen coverage improved)
• Config preset sync: all 7 presets now match Defaults() for DLP patterns, tool chain detection, and policy rules

Changed#

• Minimum version bump from 0.x to 1.0: public API (config format, CLI flags, audit schema, Prometheus metrics) is now stable. Breaking changes will follow semver.

[0.3.6] - 2026-03-06#

Added#

• TLS interception for CONNECT tunnels: opt-in MITM decrypts tunnel traffic for full request body DLP, header DLP, and response injection scanning. ECDSA P-256 CA with bounded TTL certificate cache.
• pipelock tls init command: generates a local CA key pair for TLS interception
• pipelock tls show-ca command: displays the CA certificate (PEM) for manual trust
• pipelock tls install-ca command: installs the CA into the system trust store
• tls_interception config section with enabled, ca_cert, ca_key, cert_ttl, and passthrough_domains fields. Hot-reload wiring for CA config changes.
• TLS interception SSRF-safe upstream dialer prevents DNS rebinding during intercepted connections
• TLS interception status reported in /health endpoint
• pipelock_tls_intercept_total, pipelock_tls_handshake_duration_seconds, pipelock_tls_request_blocked_total, pipelock_tls_response_blocked_total, pipelock_tls_cert_cache_size Prometheus metrics
• tls_authority_mismatch, tls_response_blocked audit events with MITRE technique labels
• All 7 config presets updated with tls_interception section defaults
• pipelock report command: reads JSONL audit logs and produces HTML, JSON, or Ed25519-signed evidence bundle reports with risk rating, event categories, timeline histogram, and evidence appendix. Supports --format, --output, --sign, and --config flags.
• MCP tool poisoning: parameter schema scanning extracts parameter key names from inputSchema at all nesting depths, expands underscore/hyphen/camelCase names, and scans for exfiltration intent (catches the CyberArk attack variant where data theft is encoded in parameter names while descriptions stay clean)
• Exfiltration Parameter Name poison pattern: detects action+target combinations in tool parameter names (read+private_key, steal+credentials, fetch+access_token)
• MCP tool drift summaries now report which parameters were added or removed instead of generic "description changed" messages
• Audit schema: chain detection structured events, startup/reload config hash metadata, version tracking
• Config.Hash() for deterministic SHA256 of raw config file bytes (used in signed reports)
• Dependency review GitHub Actions workflow: blocks PRs that introduce dependencies with known vulnerabilities
• CI concurrency groups: in-progress runs cancelled when new commits push to the same branch
• SPDX Apache 2.0 license headers on all Go source files
• GitHub Sponsors funding configuration
• Contributor License Agreement (Apache ICLA) section in CONTRIBUTING.md
• SPONSORS.md for sponsor recognition

Fixed#

• Environment variable leak scanner: ~50 well-known non-secret variables (HOME, PATH, USER, PWD, SHELL, TERM, LANG, EDITOR, GOPATH, LS_COLORS, and others) are now skipped by name, reducing false positives when agents send standard environment values in tool arguments. Case-insensitive matching handles Windows-style mixed-case names.
• TLS interception: ActionAsk treated as block inside intercepted tunnels (no HITL terminal available in TLS context)
• TLS interception: LoadCA validates cert.IsCA, KeyUsageCertSign, and key correspondence. Rejects cert_ttl <= 0 and group/world-readable CA keys.
• MCP: skip general injection scanner for tools/list responses when tool scanning is enabled, preventing false positives on instructional tool descriptions (e.g. "you must call this tool")
• Report: chain detection severity derived from action (block=critical, warn=warn) instead of storing caller-provided value
• Report: hash raw client IP in audit session field when Mcp-Session-Id absent, preventing IP leak
• Report: plain blocked events without an action field now get high severity instead of medium
• Report: evidence appendix redacts connect_host and sni_host IP addresses
• Report: admin events (startup, shutdown, config_reload) excluded from timeline histogram
• Report: skipped JSONL lines tracked and surfaced in summary and HTML template
• Report: criticals KPI counter uses severity count (was always 0)
• Report: exec summary uses traffic-only event count as denominator (excludes admin events)
• Report: multi-day timeline labels use "Jan 2" date format instead of "00:00" for all bars

Changed#

• Documentation version references use v1/latest instead of pinned version numbers so guides stay current across releases

[0.3.5] - 2026-03-05#

Added#

• Kill switch API token can now be set via PIPELOCK_KILLSWITCH_API_TOKEN environment variable, overriding the kill_switch.api_token config field. Enables Kubernetes deployments to source the token from a Secret instead of a ConfigMap.
• Request body DLP scanning for the forward HTTP proxy. Scans POST/PUT/PATCH bodies for secrets across JSON (recursive string extraction), form-urlencoded, multipart/form-data, and raw text. Unknown content types get a fallback raw-text scan to prevent Content-Type spoofing bypass. Fail-closed on oversized bodies, compressed bodies, parse errors, and multipart limit violations.
• Request header DLP scanning for the forward proxy and fetch handler. Two modes: sensitive (scan listed headers only) and all (scan everything except structural headers, including header names). Joined scan catches secrets split across multiple headers.
• request_body_scanning config section with enabled, action, max_body_bytes, scan_headers, header_mode, sensitive_headers, and ignore_headers fields
• pipelock_body_dlp_hits_total and pipelock_header_dlp_hits_total Prometheus counters
• body_dlp and header_dlp audit event types
• Shared JSON string extractor (internal/extract) used by both proxy body scanning and MCP input scanning
• hostile-model config preset for agents running uncensored or jailbroken models
• Windows build support: GoReleaser produces Windows amd64/arm64 binaries (zip archives). Kill switch signal toggle and config reload signal are no-ops on Windows; all other features work identically.
• CONNECT tunnel SNI verification: detects domain fronting (T1090.004) by comparing the CONNECT target hostname against the TLS SNI extension. Enabled via forward_proxy.sni_verification: true. pipelock_sni_total Prometheus counter tracks matches.
• pipelock claude hook/setup/remove commands for Claude Code hook integration
• MCP confused deputy protection: validates that MCP server response IDs match previously tracked request IDs. Blocks unsolicited responses that could hijack agent execution flow.
• IPv4 and IPv6 multicast CIDRs (224.0.0.0/4, ff00::/8) added to default SSRF internal address list

Fixed#

• IPv6 zone ID SSRF bypass: URLs like http://[::1%25eth0]/ no longer skip CIDR checks. Zone IDs are stripped before IP parsing.

[0.3.4] - 2026-03-04#

Fixed#

• pipelock cursor install now writes Cursor's v1 hooks.json format (map keyed by event name with version field). Previously wrote a flat array that Cursor silently ignored, causing hooks to never fire.
• pipelock cursor install now preserves args fields on existing hooks during merge. Previously, non-pipelock hooks with args arrays lost their arguments after install or upgrade.
• pipelock preflight now scans both v1 and legacy hooks.json formats. Previously only understood the legacy format and would false-positive on v1 files.

[0.3.3] - 2026-03-04#

Added#

• pipelock verify-install command: 10 deterministic checks verifying scanning pipeline and network containment. Produces human-readable or --json output with optional Ed25519 --sign for tamper-evident reports. Supports --output to write results to file.
• pipelock cursor hook subcommand: Cursor IDE hook integration. Reads hook events from stdin, evaluates DLP, injection, and tool policy, writes allow/deny JSON to stdout. Always exits 0 with JSON permission field as the authoritative decision. Without --config, uses a security-focused default profile with 9 tool policy rules, MCP input scanning, and response scanning enabled.
• pipelock cursor install subcommand: writes hooks.json to register pipelock with Cursor. Supports --global (default, ~/.cursor/) and --project (.cursor/ in cwd). Atomic writes via temp file + rename, .bak backup, idempotent merge with existing hooks, upgrade-safe replacement of stale entries.
• internal/decide package: shared decision engine for evaluating agent actions against pipelock's scanning pipeline. Supports shell execution, MCP tool calls, and file read events with per-finding action semantics (block vs warn) and enforce flag override.
• Fail-closed on malformed MCP tool_input: invalid JSON in tool arguments is treated as block-level evidence. Legitimate MCP tool calls always have valid JSON; parse failure indicates tampering or corruption.
• pipelock audit --preflight scanner: detects dangerous IDE configuration files (.cursor/mcp.json, .vscode/mcp.json) in project directories that could override agent security settings. Reports threat level (critical/high/medium/low) with actionable remediation steps.

Changed#

• Replaced all //nolint:gosec G304 suppressions with filepath.Clean() across production and test code (84 occurrences in 26 files). No behavioral change.
• Eliminated all //nolint:goconst directives, extracted named constants

Fixed#

• Pre-existing lint issues in tests/ws-helper/main.go: errcheck on conn.Close(), noctx on net.Listen

[0.3.2] - 2026-03-02#

Added#

• pipelock diagnose command: fully local end-to-end configuration verification. Spins up a mock upstream and temp proxy, runs 6 checks (health, fetch allowed/blocked, hint presence, CONNECT allowed/blocked). Exit 0 on pass, 1 on failure, 2 on config error. Supports --json and --config.
• explain_blocks config field (opt-in, default false): blocked responses include actionable hints explaining why a request was blocked and how to fix it. Fetch proxy gets a JSON hint field, CONNECT and WebSocket get an X-Pipelock-Hint header. Hints are per-scanner (DLP, blocklist, SSRF, entropy, rate limit, etc.).
• Scanner label constants (scanner.ScannerDLP, scanner.ScannerBlocklist, etc.): 12 exported constants matching existing on-wire metric label values
• proxy.Handler() method: returns the composed HTTP handler for use with httptest.NewServer or custom listeners
• Docker Compose quickstart (examples/quickstart/): production-ready two-network architecture with internal: true isolation, opt-in verification suite (5 tests: network isolation, DLP, response injection, MCP tool poisoning), attacker container for reproducible demos

Fixed#

• generate mcporter now preserves per-server extra fields (alwaysAllow, disabled, metadata, headers, etc.) during wrapping. Previously only command, args, and env survived.
• WebSocket scanner label split: protocol enforcement events now correctly use ws_protocol label
• Grafana dashboard template variable syntax corrected for fleet filtering

Changed#

• Reusable scan workflow actions pinned to commit SHAs for OpenSSF Scorecard compliance

[0.3.1] - 2026-03-01#

Added#

• WebSocket MCP transport: --upstream ws:// and wss:// for MCP proxy connections, with the same 6-layer scanning pipeline as stdio and HTTP modes
• pipelock generate mcporter CLI: wraps MCP server configs with pipelock scanning. Reads any JSON with mcpServers, preserves env blocks, detects already-wrapped servers, idempotent
• pipelock-init container image: Alpine-based multi-arch image for K8s initContainer deployments, replaces multi-line wget/tar/chmod scripts with cp /pipelock /shared-bin/pipelock
• MITRE ATT&CK technique IDs mapped to all scanner labels (T1048, T1059, T1046, T1071.001, T1190, T1195.002, T1078, T1030) in blocked, anomaly, ws_scan, response_scan, session_anomaly, and mcp_unknown_tool audit events and emitted payloads
• pipelock_kill_switch_active{source} Prometheus gauge via custom collector (fresh state per scrape, four sources: config, api, signal, sentinel)
• pipelock_info{version} build information metric
• Metrics port isolation: metrics_listen config field runs /metrics and /stats on a dedicated port, preventing agents from scraping operational metadata. Changes rejected on hot-reload with a warning.
• Cosign signature verification in the GitHub Action: release checksums verified against Sigstore attestation before binary install. Graceful degradation when cosign is unavailable.
• Reusable GitHub Actions security scan workflow (.github/workflows/reusable-scan.yml) with 7 configurable inputs and score, findings-count, critical-count outputs
• 7 new docs: configuration reference, deployment recipes (Docker/K8s/iptables/macOS PF), bypass resistance matrix, attacks-blocked gallery, policy spec v0.1, transport modes guide, OpenClaw deployment guide
• Prometheus metrics reference (docs/metrics.md): all 20 metrics with scrape config and PodMonitor example
• 11 ready-to-use Prometheus alert rules (examples/prometheus/pipelock-alerts.yaml)
• Grafana dashboard rebuilt from 4-panel overview to 18-panel fleet monitor with per-source kill switch status, chain detection by pattern, session anomaly breakdown, escalation timeseries, and multi-instance $instance filter variable
• filterAndActOnResponseScan helper: extracted response scan action handling (suppress, block, ask, strip, warn) to eliminate duplication between raw HTML and extracted text scan paths
• Demo extended with base64-encoded secret detection, git diff scanning, and config generation steps

Fixed#

• internal: [] in YAML config now correctly disables SSRF checks. Previously, ApplyDefaults() treated explicit empty slices the same as absent fields, filling in default CIDRs. This blocked legitimate Docker container traffic on private IPs (172.x.x.x).
• Reject WebSocket compressed frames (RSV1 bit): compressed bytes bypass DLP pattern matching entirely, now closed with StatusProtocolError on both relay directions
• Scan raw HTML body before go-readability extraction: injection hidden in HTML comments, script/style tags, and hidden elements was stripped before the response scanner could detect it
• Use Mozilla Public Suffix List for ccTLD-aware domain grouping: baseDomain() now correctly groups evil.co.uk instead of merging all .co.uk domains into one rate limit bucket
• Prompt injection detection regex broadened to catch determiner-before-modifier evasion variants (e.g. "ignore your previous instructions", "forget the prior rules")
• RFC 6455 compliance: WebSocket proxy now sends masked close frames to upstream connections (previously sent unmasked server-style frames)

Changed#

• Telemetry label split: WebSocket protocol enforcement events (binary frame rejection, fragment errors) now emit scanner label ws_protocol instead of policy. The policy label is now exclusively for MCP tool policy violations. MITRE mapping: ws_protocol maps to T1071 (Application Layer Protocol), policy remains T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter). Update any dashboards or alert rules that filter on scanner="policy" for WebSocket-specific events.
• internal/wsutil package extracted: shared WebSocket utilities (fragment reassembly, close frames, error classification) used by both the HTTP WS proxy and MCP WS transport
• Anomaly audit events now include scanner as a structured field with MITRE technique mapping (previously embedded in reason string)
• README slimmed from 829 to ~490 lines; full configuration YAML replaced with link to docs/configuration.md, forward proxy quick start moved to collapsible section
• Quick start updated to use pipelock check (works without running the proxy)
• golang.org/x/net promoted from indirect to direct dependency (publicsuffix for ccTLD handling)

[0.3.0] - 2026-02-27#

Added#

• Kill switch: emergency deny-all with four activation sources (config, SIGUSR1 signal, sentinel file, HTTP API), OR-composed so any single source blocks all proxy traffic
• Kill switch API: POST /api/v1/killswitch (activate/deactivate) and GET /api/v1/killswitch/status (per-source state) with bearer token auth, rate limiting, and input hardening (MaxBytesReader, DisallowUnknownFields, strict EOF enforcement)
• Kill switch port isolation: api_listen config field runs the kill switch API on a dedicated port, preventing agents from deactivating their own kill switch in sidecar deployments
• Event emission: fire-and-forget dispatch to webhook and syslog sinks with independent severity filters (info, warn, critical), configurable instance_id, and async buffered delivery
• Webhook sink: HTTP POST with bearer token auth, configurable timeout and queue size, background worker with graceful shutdown
• Syslog sink: UDP/TCP delivery with configurable facility, tag, and severity mapping to syslog priority levels
• Finding suppression: silence known false positives via config (suppress entries with rule name, path glob, and reason) or inline // pipelock:ignore source comments
• Tool call chain detection: subsequence matching on MCP tool call sequences with 8 built-in attack patterns (recon, credential theft, data staging, exfiltration), configurable window size, time-based eviction, and max-gap constraint
• Session profiling and adaptive enforcement config sections (scoring-only in v1, observability groundwork)
• Health endpoint now reports kill_switch_active field
• Preset configs (strict, balanced) updated with kill switch and emit examples (commented out)
• DLP: 6 new patterns: Fireworks API Key, Google API Key, Google OAuth Client Secret (GOCSPX), Slack App Token (xapp-), JWT Token, Google OAuth Client ID
• DLP: expanded AWS Access ID detection from AKIA-only to all 9 credential prefixes (AKIA, ASIA, AROA, AIDA, AIPA, AGPA, ANPA, ANVA, A3T)
• DLP: expanded GitHub Token detection to cover all 5 token types (ghp, gho, ghu, ghs, ghr)
• All 6 preset configs (balanced, strict, audit, claude-code, cursor, generic-agent) updated with expanded DLP pattern set (22 patterns)
• DLP include_defaults config field: when true (default), user-defined DLP patterns are merged with built-in defaults by name, so new default patterns are automatically added on binary upgrade without requiring config changes. Set include_defaults: false to use only user-defined patterns (previous behavior). Same field available for response_scanning.
• Finding suppression guide (docs/guides/suppression.md): documents all three suppression layers (inline comments, config entries, --exclude flag), available rule names, path matching styles, and GitHub Action integration

Fixed#

• Close WebSocket cross-message DLP bypass: secrets split across WebSocket text frames are now detected via fragment reassembly buffer scanning (PR #140)
• Close header rotation evasion: IP-level domain tracking prevents agents from rotating Host/Origin headers to bypass per-domain rate limits (PR #141)

Changed#

• MCP package refactored into sub-packages: transport, tools, policy, jsonrpc for clearer separation of concerns
• Audit logger enhanced with event emission dispatch: audit calls now route to configured webhook/syslog sinks based on severity
• Normalize package extracted as internal/normalize with ForPolicy variant for MCP tool policy command matching

[0.2.9] - 2026-02-23#

Added#

• WebSocket proxy: /ws?url=ws://... endpoint with bidirectional frame relay, DLP + injection scanning on text frames, fragment reassembly, message size limits, SSRF-safe upstream dialer, auth header forwarding with DLP scanning, concurrency limits, connection lifetime and idle timeout controls, and Prometheus metrics
• WebSocket configuration: websocket_proxy section in config with max_message_bytes, scan_text_frames, allow_binary_frames, strip_compression, max_connection_seconds, idle_timeout_seconds, origin_policy, and max_concurrent_connections
• WebSocket health reporting: /health endpoint includes websocket_proxy_enabled field
• All 6 preset configs updated with websocket_proxy defaults (disabled by default)
• --exclude flag for pipelock audit and pipelock git scan-diff: filter findings by path using globs (*.generated.go) or directory prefixes (vendor/). Repeatable for multiple patterns.
• GitHub Action exclude-paths input: newline-separated path patterns passed to both audit and scan-diff steps

[0.2.8] - 2026-02-23#

Fixed#

• Close 9 scanner evasion bypasses found during red team testing: hex/base64-encoded secrets in URL query params and path segments, vowel-fold flag corruption on (?im) patterns, strip mode fail-open when detection came from non-redactable passes, and missing normalization passes on decoded response content (PR #135)
• Close 3 DLP evasion bypasses in query parameter scanning: iterative URL-decode, noise-stripped values, and dot-collapsed subdomain splits now applied to individual query keys and values (PR #134)

Changed#

• Encoding attribution: segment-level DLP matches now carry correct encoding labels (hex, base64, base32) instead of always reporting "hex"
• Response scanning decoded-content path runs all normalization passes (primary, opt-space, vowel-fold), closing a gap where base64/hex-encoded vowel-substituted injection could bypass detection
• Logo tagline updated to "Agent Firewall"

[0.2.7] - 2026-02-22#

Added#

• MCP HTTP reverse proxy: --mcp-listen + --mcp-upstream flags on pipelock run create an HTTP-to-HTTP scanning proxy with bidirectional JSON-RPC 2.0 validation, Authorization header DLP scanning, and fail-closed parse error handling (PR #127)
• MCP standalone HTTP listener: pipelock mcp proxy --listen :8889 --upstream http://host/mcp for deployments that only need MCP scanning without the fetch/forward proxy (PR #127)
• JSON-RPC 2.0 structural validation on HTTP listener: rejects non-string method types, wrong/missing jsonrpc version, and missing method field with proper -32600 error codes; batch requests pass through to per-element scanning (PR #127)
• CI dogfooding: Pipelock's own GitHub Action runs on every PR, scanning diffs for exposed credentials and injection patterns (PR #126)

Fixed#

• Release workflow: semver-only tag filter (v*.*.*) prevents floating tags like v1 from triggering spurious GoReleaser releases (PR #126)
• Auto-move v1 floating tag after each semver release so the GitHub Action always resolves to the latest version (PR #126)

Changed#

• MCP auto-enable default: mcp_input_scanning.action changed from warn to block when auto-enabled in proxy mode, preventing credential forwarding in balanced configs (PR #127)
• Default response scanning and DLP patterns auto-populated when MCP listener enables scanning on an unconfigured section (PR #127)

[0.2.6] - 2026-02-21#

Added#

• HTTP forward proxy: standard CONNECT tunneling and absolute-URI HTTP forwarding on the same port as the fetch proxy. Set HTTPS_PROXY=http://localhost:8888 and all agent HTTP traffic flows through the scanner pipeline. Configurable tunnel duration and idle timeout controls (PR #123)
• Tunnel observability: Prometheus metrics (tunnel count, bytes transferred, duration histogram, active gauge), JSON stats, and structured audit logs for tunnel open/close events (PR #123)
• GitHub Action (luckyPipewrench/pipelock): composite action for CI/CD agent security scanning with checksum-verified binary download, multi-arch (amd64/arm64) and multi-OS (Linux/macOS) support, fail-closed audit gate, PR diff secret scanning, inline GitHub annotations on findings, and job summary (PR #125)
• CI workflow examples for basic and advanced GitHub Action usage (PR #125)

Changed#

• Forward proxy enabled by default in all 6 preset configs: balanced, strict, audit, claude-code, cursor, generic-agent (PR #125)
• Action string constants extracted to config package (ActionBlock, ActionWarn, ActionAsk, ActionStrip, ActionForward), replacing ~70 hardcoded literals across 12 files (PR #124)
• README rewritten with forward proxy "zero code changes" quickstart as primary path, refreshed benchmarks and testing stats, honest security assessment section (PR #122, #125)
• Copyright updated to legal name in LICENSE (PR #122)

[0.2.5] - 2026-02-20#

Added#

• MCP --env flag: pass specific environment variables to child processes without exposing the full environment (PR #119)

Fixed#

• Tool poisoning detection: instruction tag patterns (<IMPORTANT>, <system>) and dangerous capability patterns (file exfil, cross-tool manipulation) hardened via adversarial testing (PR #117)

Changed#

• Rebrand from "security harness" to "agent firewall" across all user-facing surfaces: CLI, README, docs, demo, Homebrew formula (PR #120)
• Extract internal/normalize package: consolidate Unicode normalization pipeline, add ForPolicy variant for command matching (PR #116)
• Documentation refresh: updated comparison matrix, stale references, testing stats (PR #118)

[0.2.4] - 2026-02-19#

Added#

• MCP Streamable HTTP transport: pipelock mcp proxy --upstream <url> bridges stdio clients to remote MCP servers over HTTP with SSE stream support and session lifecycle management (PR #112)
• Pre-execution tool call policy: configurable mcp_tool_policy blocks dangerous commands (rm -rf, curl to external, chmod 777) before MCP tools execute, with pairwise token matching and whitespace normalization (PR #107)
• Known secret scanning: dlp.secrets_file config loads explicit secrets from file, scans URLs and MCP tool arguments for raw + base64/hex/base32 encoded variants including unpadded forms (PR #111)
• pipelock test CLI command: validates scanner coverage against loaded config with structured pass/fail output per scanner layer (PR #109)
• Framework integration guides: OpenAI Agents SDK, Google ADK, AutoGen (PR #110)
• GOVERNANCE.md, ROADMAP.md, and security assurance documentation for OpenSSF Silver (PR #108)
• OpenSSF Best Practices Silver badge (PR #114)

Fixed#

• Unicode bypass in injection and DLP scanning: full homoglyph normalization (Cyrillic, Greek, Armenian, Cherokee), combining mark stripping, leetspeak normalization, 6 new injection patterns (PR #105)
• govulncheck CI flake: pinned Go version to 1.24.13 to prevent runner cache inconsistency (PR #113)
• Codecov targets raised to 95% project / 90% patch (PR #113)

Changed#

• README Quick Start reordered: pipelock check before pipelock run since check doesn't need a running proxy (PR #113)
• CONTRIBUTING.md updated with complete CLI command list and project structure (PR #113)
• Demo script uses DEMO_TMPDIR instead of TMPDIR to avoid shadowing POSIX env var (PR #113)
• CI matrix tests Go 1.24 + 1.25 (PR #113)

[0.2.3] - 2026-02-16#

Added#

• MCP transport abstraction: MessageReader/MessageWriter interfaces decouple scanning from stdio framing, preparing for HTTP transport
• Demo command: 7 attack scenarios (was 5), adding MCP input secret leak and tool description poisoning demos
• Demo ANSI color output with NO_COLOR env var support and TTY detection
• Demo --interactive flag for live presentations (pauses between scenarios)
• CrewAI integration guide (docs/guides/crewai.md)
• LangGraph integration guide (docs/guides/langgraph.md)
• WriteMessage size guard (10 MB limit) prevents unbounded memory allocation on malformed input
• maxLineSize guard on stdio message reader for consistency with write path

Fixed#

• Strict-mode API allowlist enforcement: requests to non-allowlisted domains now blocked in strict mode (was warn-only)
• MCP no-params DLP bypass: requests with missing params field bypassed input scanning entirely
• Encoded secret bypass in MCP input: multi-layer percent-encoding could evade DLP patterns
• Display URL normalization: audit log URLs now consistently decoded for readability
• Three static analysis findings: ViolationPermissions field visibility, HITL reload-to-ask warning, stale comment

Changed#

• Demo "MCP Tool Poisoning" scenario renamed to "MCP Response Injection" for clarity
• iterativeDecode consolidated into single exported function (was duplicated across scanner paths)
• Write errors in syncWriter and StdioWriter now wrapped with context
• Bumped sigstore/cosign-installer from 3.10.1 to 4.0.0

[0.2.2] - 2026-02-15#

Added#

• MCP tool description scanning: detects poisoned tool descriptions containing hidden instructions (<IMPORTANT> tags, file exfiltration directives, cross-tool manipulation)
• MCP tool rug-pull detection: SHA256 baseline tracks tool definitions per session, alerts when descriptions change mid-session
• mcp_tool_scanning config section (action: warn/block, detect_drift: true/false)
• Auto-enabled in mcp proxy mode unless explicitly configured
• Unicode normalization (NFKC) and C0 control character stripping in tool description scanning
• Recursive schema extraction: scans description and title fields from nested inputSchema objects
• JSON-RPC batch response handling for tool scanning
• CODEOWNERS file for automatic review assignment
• Cosign keyless signing for release checksums (Sigstore transparency log)
• Manual trigger (workflow_dispatch) for OpenSSF Scorecard workflow

Fixed#

• Fetch proxy URL parameter truncation: unencoded & in target URLs silently truncated secrets from DLP scanner
• Fetch proxy control character bypass: %00, %08, %09, %0a in target URLs broke DLP regex matching
• Empty-name tool bypass: tools with no name field bypassed tools/list scanning entirely
• Baseline capacity DoS: malicious servers could force hash computation on unlimited unique tool names (added capacity cap with ShouldSkip())

Changed#

• Branch protection: squash-only merges, stale review dismissal

[0.2.1] - 2026-02-15#

Added#

• SLSA build provenance attestation for all release binaries and container images
• CycloneDX SBOM generated and attached to every release
• OpenSSF Scorecard workflow with results published to GitHub Security tab
• govulncheck CI job scanning Go dependencies for known vulnerabilities
• go mod verify step in CI and release pipelines
• OpenSSF Scorecard badge in README
• OpenSSF Best Practices passing badge in README
• Release verification instructions in README (gh attestation verify)

Changed#

• All GitHub Actions pinned to commit SHAs (supply chain hardening)
• Release workflow now includes id-token and attestations permissions for provenance signing
• Explicit top-level permissions: contents: read in CI workflow (least privilege)
• Release attestation steps use continue-on-error with final verification (prevents cascading failures)
• Container digest resolution uses ::warning annotation instead of silent fallback
• govulncheck, cyclonedx-gomod, and crane pinned to specific versions (not @latest)
• Docker base images pinned by SHA256 digest (Scorecard Pinned-Dependencies)
• Write permissions moved from workflow-level to job-level (Scorecard Token-Permissions)
• Branch protection: added PR requirement, lint as required check, strict status policy, review thread resolution

Fixed#

• Fetch proxy DNS subdomain exfiltration: dot-collapse scanning now applied to hostnames in checkDLP (was only on MCP text scanning side)
• MCP content block split bypass: ExtractText now joins blocks with space separator (was \n, allowing between-word injection splits to evade detection)
• Git DLP case sensitivity: CompileDLPPatterns now applies (?i) prefix, matching URL scanner behavior
• Rate limiter subdomain rotation: checkRateLimit now uses baseDomain() normalization, preventing per-subdomain rate limit evasion
• Response scanning Unicode whitespace bypass: added normalizeWhitespace() for Ogham space (U+1680), Mongolian vowel separator (U+180E), and line/paragraph separators
• Agent name path traversal: ValidateAgentName now rejects names containing .. or equal to .
• URL DLP NFKC normalization: applied norm.NFKC.String() before DLP pattern matching, consistent with response scanning

[0.2.0] - 2026-02-13#

Added#

• MCP input scanning: bidirectional proxy now scans client requests for DLP leaks and injection in tool arguments
• mcp_input_scanning config section (action: warn/block, on_parse_error: block/forward)
• Auto-enabled in mcp proxy mode unless explicitly configured
• Iterative URL decoding in text DLP (catches double/triple percent-encoding)
• Method name and request ID fields included in DLP scan coverage
• OPENSSH private key format added to Private Key Header DLP pattern
• Split-key concatenation scanning: detects secrets split across multiple JSON arguments
• DNS subdomain exfiltration detection: dot-collapse scanning catches secrets split across subdomains
• Case-insensitive DLP pattern matching: prevents evasion via .toUpperCase() or mixed-case secrets
• Null byte stripping in scanner pipeline: prevents regex-splitting bypass via \x00 injection
• 55+ new tests for input scanning, text DLP, and config validation

Changed#

• CI workflow: removed redundant go vet and go mod verify steps, combined duplicate test runs, added job timeouts
• Audit preset on_parse_error changed from block to forward (consistent with observe-only philosophy)
• Config validation rejects ask action for input scanning (no terminal interaction on request path)
• CLI auto-enable checks both enabled and action fields (unconfigured = both at zero values)

[0.1.8] - 2026-02-12#

Added#

• Audit log sanitization: ANSI escapes and control characters stripped from all log fields (internal/audit/logger.go)
• Data budget enforcement per registrable domain (prevents subdomain variation bypass)
• Hex-encoded environment variable leak detection
• Container startup warning when running as root
• HITL channel drain before each prompt (prevents stale input from prior timeout)
• DLP patterns for github_pat_ fine-grained PATs and Stripe keys ([sr]k_(live|test)_)
• Fuzz test for audit log sanitizer
• Integrity manifest path traversal protection
• 970+ tests passing with -race

Security#

• MCP proxy fail-closed: unparseable responses now blocked in all action modes (was forwarding in warn/strip/ask)
• MCP batch scanning fail-closed: parse errors on individual elements now propagate as dirty verdict
• MCP strip recursion depth limit (maxStripDepth=4) prevents stack overflow from nested JSON arrays

Fixed#

• DLP pattern overlap: OpenAI Service Key narrowed to sk-svcacct- (was sk-(proj|svcacct)-, overlapping with existing sk-proj- pattern)
• Redirect-to-SSRF: blocked flag now set on redirect hops (redirect to private IP was not caught)
• Rate limiter returns HTTP 429 Too Many Requests (was returning 403)
• io.Pipe resource leak in HITL tests

Removed#

• SKILL.md (ClawHub listing discontinued)

[0.1.6] - 2026-02-11#

Added#

• --json flag for git scan-diff command (CI/CD integration)
• Fuzz tests for 8 security-critical functions across 4 packages
• 660+ tests passing with -race

Security#

• IPv4-mapped IPv6 SSRF bypass: ::ffff:127.0.0.1 now normalized via To4() before CIDR matching
• MCP ToolResult schema bypass: result field uses json.RawMessage with recursive string extraction fallback
• MCP zero-width Unicode stripping applied to response content scanning
• DNS subdomain exfiltration: DLP/entropy checks now run on hostname before DNS resolution
• --no-prefix git diff bypass: parser accepts +++ filename without b/ prefix
• MCP error messages (error.message and error.data) now scanned for injection
• Double URL encoding DLP bypass: iterative decode (max 3 rounds) on path segments
• Default SSRF CIDRs: added 0.0.0.0/8 and 100.64.0.0/10 (CGN/Tailscale)
• CRLF line ending normalization in git diff parsing
• ReadHeaderTimeout added to HTTP server (Slowloris protection)
• Non-text MCP content blocks now scanned (was skipping non-text types)

Fixed#

• Homebrew formula push: use HOMEBREW_TAP_TOKEN secret for cross-repo access

[0.1.5] - 2026-02-10#

Added#

• pipelock audit command: scans projects for security gaps, generates score (0-100) and suggested config (internal/projectscan/)
• pipelock demo command: 5 self-contained attack scenarios (DLP, injection, blocklist, entropy, MCP) using real scanner pipeline
• OWASP Agentic AI Top 15 threat mapping (docs/owasp-agentic-top15-mapping.md, 12/15 threats covered)
• 14 scanner pipeline benchmarks with make bench target (~3 microseconds per allowed URL)
• Grafana dashboard JSON (configs/grafana-dashboard.json, 7 panels, 3 rows)
• SVG logo
• Public contributor guide (CLAUDE.md)
• CONTRIBUTING.md expanded with detailed development workflow
• 756+ tests passing with -race

Fixed#

• Audit score: critical finding penalty (-5 per leaked secret found)
• DLP pattern compilation deduplication
• Follow mode context-aware shutdown in logs command
• Blog links updated from GitHub Pages to pipelab.org
• OWASP mapping updated to 2026 final category names

[0.1.4] - 2026-02-09#

Added#

• MCP stdio proxy mode: pipelock mcp proxy -- <command> wraps any MCP server, scanning responses in real-time (internal/mcp/proxy.go)
• Human-in-the-loop terminal approvals: action: ask prompts for y/N/s with configurable timeout (internal/hitl/)
• Agent-specific config presets: configs/claude-code.yaml, configs/cursor.yaml, configs/generic-agent.yaml
• Claude Code integration guide (docs/guides/claude-code.md)
• Homebrew formula in GoReleaser config
• Asciinema demo recording embedded in README

Fixed#

• Makefile VERSION fallback: git describe failure no longer produces empty version string
• OpenAI API key DLP regex: now matches keys containing - and _ characters
• HITL approver data race: single reader goroutine pattern eliminates concurrent bufio.Reader access on timeout
• GoReleaser v2: folder renamed to directory in Homebrew brews config

[0.1.3] - 2026-02-09#

Added#

• File integrity monitoring for agent workspaces (pipelock integrity init|check|update)
• SHA256 manifest generation with glob exclusion patterns (** doublestar support)
• Integrity check reports: modified, added, and removed file detection
• JSON output mode for integrity checks (--json flag)
• Custom manifest path support (--manifest flag)
• Atomic manifest writes (temp file + rename) to prevent corruption
• Manifest version validation and nil-files guard on load
• Ed25519 signing for file and manifest verification (pipelock keygen|sign|verify|trust)
• Key storage under ~/.pipelock/ with versioned format headers
• Trusted key management for inter-agent signature verification
• Path traversal protection in keystore operations
• MCP JSON-RPC 2.0 response scanning for prompt injection (pipelock mcp scan)
• MCP scanning: text extraction from content blocks, split-injection detection via concatenation
• MCP scanning: --json output mode (one verdict per line) and --config flag
• Blog at pipelab.org/blog/
• 530+ tests passing with -race

Fixed#

• DLP bypass: secrets in URL hostnames/subdomains now scanned (full-URL DLP scan)
• DLP bypass: secrets split across query parameters now detected
• README: corrected signing CLI syntax, agent types, health version example
• GoReleaser: added missing BuildDate/GitCommit/GoVersion ldflags
• Blog: fixed hallucinated product name, removed stale "coming next" reference

Security#

• json.RawMessage null bypass prevention (MCP result always scanned regardless of error field)

Removed#

• Stale Phase 1.5 planning doc (planning docs live outside the repo)

[0.1.2] - 2026-02-08#

Added#

• CodeQL security scanning workflow
• Codecov coverage integration and badge
• Go Report Card badge

Fixed#

• All 53 golangci-lint warnings resolved (zero-warning CI baseline)
• 363 tests passing with -race

[0.1.1] - 2026-02-08#

Changed#

• CLI commands write to cmd.OutOrStdout() instead of os.Stdout (cobra-idiomatic)
• run command uses cmd.Context() as signal parent for testability

Added#

• Run command integration test (config loading, flag overrides, health check, graceful shutdown)
• Docker Compose YAML syntax validation test (all agent templates parsed via yaml.Unmarshal)
• Base64url environment variable leak detection test
• Rate limiter window rollover test
• Healthcheck command test against running server
• 363 tests passing with -race

[0.1.0] - 2026-02-08#

Added#

• Fetch proxy server with /fetch, /health, /metrics, and /stats endpoints
• URL scanning pipeline: scheme check, SSRF protection, domain blocklist, rate limiting, URL length, DLP regex, Shannon entropy
• SSRF protection with configurable CIDR ranges (IPv4 + IPv6), fail-closed DNS resolution, DNS rebinding prevention via pinned DialContext
• DLP pattern matching for API keys, tokens, secrets (Anthropic, OpenAI, GitHub, Slack, AWS, Discord, private keys, SSNs)
• Shannon entropy analysis for detecting encoded/encrypted data in URL segments
• Environment variable leak detection: scans URLs for high-entropy env var values (raw + base64-encoded)
• Domain blocklist with wildcard support (*.pastebin.com)
• Per-domain rate limiting with sliding window and configurable max_requests_per_minute
• Response scanning: fetched page content scanned for prompt injection patterns (block/strip/warn actions)
• Multi-agent support: X-Pipelock-Agent header identifies calling agents; agent name included in audit logs and fetch responses
• Agent name sanitization to prevent log injection
• Structured JSON audit logging via zerolog (allowed, blocked, error, anomaly, redirect events)
• YAML configuration with validation and sensible defaults
• Config hot-reload via fsnotify file watching and SIGHUP signal (when using --config)
• Hot-reload panic recovery: invalid config reloads are caught and logged without crashing the proxy
• Three operating modes: strict, balanced (default), audit
• CLI commands: run, check, generate config, generate docker-compose, logs, git scan-diff, git install-hooks, version, healthcheck
• Config presets: configs/balanced.yaml, configs/strict.yaml, configs/audit.yaml
• Docker Compose generation for network-isolated agent deployments (pipelock generate docker-compose)
• HTML content extraction via go-readability
• Redirect following with per-hop URL scanning (max 5 redirects)
• Graceful shutdown on SIGINT/SIGTERM
• Prometheus metrics: pipelock_requests_total, pipelock_scanner_hits_total, pipelock_request_duration_seconds
• JSON stats endpoint: top blocked domains, scanner hits, block rate, uptime
• Build metadata injection via ldflags (version, date, commit, Go version)
• Docker support: scratch-based image (~15MB), multi-arch (amd64/arm64), GHCR via GoReleaser
• GitHub Actions CI (Go 1.24 + 1.25, race detector, vet)
• 345 tests with -race